There exists evidence in the social science literature that women may be more relationshiporiented, may have higher standards of ethical behavior and may be more concerned with the common good than men are. This would imply that women are more willing to sacri…ce private pro…t for the public good, which would be especially important for political life. A number of papers with …eld data have found di¤erences in the corrupt activities of males and females, nonetheless they have drawbacks that may be overcome in a lab experiment.
Introduction
A large stream of research papers has documented systematic gender di¤erences in behavior.
This evidence suggests that women may be more relationship-oriented, may have higher standards of ethical behavior and may be more concerned with the common good than men are.
This would imply that women are more willing to sacri…ce private pro…t for the public good, and this would be especially important for political life.
Criminology literature shows that men are more likely to commit o¤enses than females (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990 ). This gender di¤erence does not vary over time and countries; it starts at low ages and is maintained through the years. Additionally, they show evidence that crimes committed by men are more serious than those committed by women.
In the economics literature, a number of …eld data papers have found that women are less tolerant toward dishonest behavior, and that there exists a negative relation between women's participation rate in politics and corruption level. However, it can be argued that the observed gender di¤erence in behavior in the …eld may be due to other reasons than real gender di¤erences in corrupt behavior; possible interferences that can be controlled in a laboratory experiment. One possible reason is the di¤erent degree of risk aversion of males and females as observed in many experiments. This could be an important determinant of gender di¤erence given that corrupt behavior (almost) always implies a probability of being discovered and thus being punished.
Therefore, a gender di¤erence in behavior could be due to a di¤erence in risk aversion -women who are more risk averse would avoid risky activities such as getting involved in corrupt activities more frequently than men. In this experiment I control for risk aversion, trying to isolate the results from the in ‡uence of this variable.
Another possible explanation for the observed gender di¤erence is that women have entered the labor market and politics much more recently than men. The di¤erence may therefore be due to di¤erences in terms of accessing networks of corruption, or in terms of knowledge about how to get involved in corrupt activities. Thus, it may be just a matter of time until women get involved in corrupt activities. In my experiment, subjects do not have a previous history, they do not have experience in this kind of game. Therefore, this e¤ect -the di¤erences in experience -can be ruled out as an explanation of any di¤erence observed in the lab.
A third feasible explanation is that low levels of corruption and high female political participation are both the result of a liberal democracy that simultaneously promotes gender equality and good governance. This limitation of the …eld studies can be overcome in a laboratory experiment where we observe male and female decisions taken in the same environment. This paper addresses the question of whether women and men facing the same situation behave in a di¤erent way (as suggested in the …eld data papers), or on the contrary, whether they behave similarly when women are in the same position as men. As explained in the Handbook on Fighting Corruption (Phyllis and Kpundeh, 1999) , "In broad terms, corruption is the abuse of public o¢ ce for private gain". In this paper, corrupt behavior refers to bribery.
Bribery is a form of pecuniary corruption; it is an act usually involving the giving of money or gifts to in ‡uence the behavior of the recipient in ways that are inconsistent with that person's duties or in violation of the law. In the experiment, I observe bribery through the manipulation of public o¢ cials' decisions in exchange for bribes. 1 The experimental design tries to capture the characteristics of corrupt behavior: the reciprocity between the briber and the o¢ cial, the negative externality over the public, and the probability of being discovered.
In the experiment there are two types of players: …rms and public o¢ cials. The possibility of corruption is introduced by allowing the …rm to send some amount of money as a bribe to the public o¢ cial, who has to decide between two alternatives. One of the alternatives is slightly better for the o¢ cial, while the other is much more favorable to the …rm, but has negative externalities over all the other players. I conduct four sessions: two sessions where subjects of both genders participate (one gender in one role and the other gender in the other role) and two sessions with only one gender participating. The objective is to check whether or not men and women behave di¤erently according to their partner's gender. If women are stereotyped as less corrupt, I should observe that …rms o¤er a bribe to female public o¢ cials less frequently than to male o¢ cials. Therefore, I also ask …rms about their expectations regarding the corruptibility of public o¢ cials.
The results show that if the …rm is a woman, even when controlling for relevant variables, a lower bribe is o¤ered. When asked about their beliefs regarding the probability that a public o¢ cial will accept the bribe and choose the most favorable alternative for the …rm -but with negative consequences for the other participants-both male and female …rms expect female public o¢ cials to accept the bribe and choose the corrupt alternative less frequently than male o¢ cials. Nonetheless, the econometric analysis shows that the partner's gender is not statistically signi…cant. Concerning the behavior of public o¢ cials, I …nd that if the public o¢ cial is a woman and the …rm is also a woman, the probability of accepting the bribe is lower and the probability of choosing the corrupt alternative is also lower.
The di¤erence in the assigned probabilities would suggest some stereotyping behavior in that both genders expect women to be less corrupt than men. On the other hand, when analyzing their actual behavior, they do not show overall signi…cant di¤erences according to the gender of their partners.
The main result of the experiment is that women are less corrupt than men. Therefore, the conclusion is in line with the …eld data papers. It can thus be expected that increasing female participation in the labor force and politics would help to …ght corruption.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next subsection …eld data papers dealing with gender and corruption are reviewed. An overview of some papers on experiments on gender di¤erences and corruption are given in Subsections 1.2 and 1.3, respectively. The experimental design is explained in Section 2, the results are presented in Section 3, and …nally conclusions are drawn in Section 4. Using di¤erent data sources, Swamy et al. (2001) study the hypothesis that female participation in the government would reduce corruption. Using the World Value Surveys (WVS) they …nd that women are less tolerant towards dishonest or illegal activities than men. The second data set they use is an enterprise survey conducted in Georgia, where …rm owners and managers were asked the following question: "How frequently do the o¢ cials providing the service require uno¢ cial payments? ". The evidence they …nd suggests that men are more frequently involved in corruption than women. With the third data set using cross-country data 2 , they …nd that corruption is less prevalent where women carry more weight in politics and in the labor force, in line with Dollar et al. (2001) .
Literature on corruption and gender with …eld data
In a more recent paper, Torgler and Valev (2006) investigate empirically if women are more willing to be compliant than men. Analyzing the WVS and the European Values Survey, they …nd a strong gender e¤ect: women are more willing to comply than men, and are less likely to agree that corruption and cheating on taxes can be justi…ed. Moreover, they do not observe a decline over time in the gender di¤erence, thus it contradicts the role theory which suggests that greater equality in status between men and women would decrease gender di¤erences over time. 3 Although these papers control for variables other than gender that may explain the corruption index or the acceptability of corruption (e.g. age, education, religion, earnings, etc.), they still have some drawbacks. The main criticism of these papers is that gender di¤erence may be driven by the existence of a liberal democracy that simultaneously promotes a high level of gender equality -and therefore a high level of female participation in the labor market and politics-and low levels of corruption. If this were the case, then a relationship would exist between low corruption indexes and high levels of female participation in politics, but a higher female participation in politics would not cause lower levels of corruption. Instead, both things would be caused by the presence of a liberal democracy. This potential problem is ruled out in the experiment. The subjects in the experiment -both men and women -are exposed to the same situation where they can freely choose what to do. If we …nd a gender di¤erence after controlling for the appropriate variable, it should be due to a real di¤erence in behavior between men and women. 2 They use the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, which is based on di¤erent information sources such as investor surveys and assessments of country experts. 3 Criminology literature also suggests that the role theory cannot explain di¤erences in crime rates between men and women (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990 ).
Experiments on gender di¤erences
Many papers study gender di¤erences in behavior, although they yield contradictory results. ranging from lower wages to less aggressive health treatments.
As concerns o¤ers and acceptance/rejection, Eckel and Grossman (2001) …nd no gender difference in an ultimatum game in the proposer behavior, but in the responder rate of rejections:
women are more likely to accept lower o¤ers. In a solidarity game -a variation of the dictator game -Selten and Ockenfels (1998) …nd that women are more generous (or show more solidarity) than men. In terms of reciprocity, a number of papers …nd no gender di¤erences (Eckel and Wilson, 2004a; Eckel and Wilson, 2004b) , while others …nd that women are more reciprocal 4 Evolutionary theories hold that sex di¤erences are dependent on reproduction: men are more risk taking in the period when they are trying to attract mates, while women are more risk averse in the child-bearing period (Wood and Eagly, 2002) . The socialization theory is not wholly focused on biology, but on cultural and social practices. Because men and women tend to have di¤erent social roles, they become psychologically di¤erent to adjust to their social roles (Eagly and Wood, 1999) .
than men (Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2003; Snijdes and Keren, 2004 ).
Croson and Gneezy (2008) explain all these di¤erences by di¤erent reactions to the context.
Most of the di¤erences mentioned above are due to changes in female behavior according to the context and how the experiment is framed, rather than changes in male behavior.
Another paper in this line is that of Dreber and Johannesson (2008) . They study gender di¤erences in deception in a sender-receiver game, …nding that male senders are more prone than female senders to lie in order to secure a higher payo¤ to the detriment of their partners'
payo¤ . Although the topics -deception and corruption -are not the same, they are related in that both imply negative externalities to other subjects.
This paper contributes to this literature by experimentally examining whether there exist di¤erences in the corrupt behavior of women and men.
Experiments on corruption
Given the di¢ culty of collecting reliable …eld data on corrupt activities due to the secrecy in which they take place, in recent years the topic has been studied using laboratory experiments.
In this subsection I review three research papers on corruption using experiments, Abbink et This experiment has three di¤erent treatments to separate three characteristics of corruption:
reciprocity (between the subjects involved in the activity), negative externalities over others, and the risk of being caught. 6 In the baseline -a pure reciprocity game -they …nd that the 5 Several papers look for factors that in ‡uence people's corruptibility in non-interactive games, e.g. Frank and
Schulze (2000), Schulze and Frank (2003) . 6 The corrupt relation should be based on trust and reciprocity between the subjects involved given that no binding contract is possible. As shown in many di¤erent studies, corruption implies a negative e¤ect over the public and implies a probability -generally small-of being discovered.
(non-desirable) relationship can be established through trust and reciprocity. They add negative externalities in their second treatment, …nding no evidence of any e¤ect on decision making. In the third treatment, which includes an external risk, they …nd less reciprocal cooperation. The results suggest that harsh, low-probability punishment of corruption may be very preventive. In their experiment, the instructions were written in neutral terms. In a follow-up paper, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) analyze if there exist di¤erences in behavior when the instructions are loaded. 7 They do not …nd signi…cant di¤erences between the neutral-instruction and the loaded-instruction treatments, concluding that the game is rather insensitive to the way it is presented to subjects.
Alatas et al. (forthcoming) conduct an experiment to investigate whether there exist gender di¤erences in the acceptability of corruption and whether they di¤er between countries. They conduct the experiment in Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore. The experiment is a one-shot game where subjects play in groups of three: one …rm that can o¤er a bribe, one public o¢ cial that can accept/reject the bribe, and one citizen that can punish the other two players.
They only …nd gender di¤erences in Australia, concluding that gender di¤erences are culture speci…c. Although Alatas et al. (forthcoming) investigate a subject similar to that examined in this paper, there are important di¤erences. First of all, they focus on the acceptability of corruption and not on corrupt behavior in itself, given that the public o¢ cial does not have more discretionary power other than accepting or rejecting the bribe. Secondly, they conduct a one-shot experiment, whereas I conduct a 20-round experiment. I am interested in studying corrupt behavior in a long-run relationship between the briber and the o¢ cial, while they are interested in investigating the willingness to punish corruption where the subject who might punish does not obtain any economic bene…t from doing so.
Experimental design
Using a typical bribery experiment, I consider two participants: a …rm (F hereafter) and a public o¢ cial (PO hereafter). The design of the experiment tries to capture the characteristics of corrupt behavior -the reciprocity between the briber and the bribee, the negative externality over the public, and the probability of being discovered. Focus is placed on the manipulation of a public o¢ cial's decisions through the use of a bribe. F is allowed to send some amount of money 7 The di¤erence between neutral and loaded instructions in this experiment is explained in the following section.
to PO, who has to decide between one alternative that is slightly better for himself/herself and another alternative that is much more favorable to F, but has negative externalities over all the other participants of the experiment. 89 The experiment was designed in completely neutral terms following the design used by Ab- ni…cant di¤erence in subjects'behavior between the two cases. In the loaded case, subjects were told that a …rm wanted to run an industrial plant which would have negative consequences for the public and the public o¢ cial had to decide whether to give permission or not. Prior to the public o¢ cial's decision, the …rm could make a private payment to the o¢ cial. In the case that the public o¢ cial accepted the transfer, there was a certain probability of being discovered and penalized. In this situation, it was clear that the private payment was an attempt to manipulate the public o¢ cial's decision in order to convince him/her to choose the alternative that was most favorable to the …rm, thereby causing negative externalities over the public. Given that they did not …nd signi…cant di¤erences in behavior between the neutral and loaded treatments, it can be deduced that subjects view the situation as being corrupt even when using neutral instructions. Given this result, and the tradition of using neutral instructions in experimental economics, I follow the neutral design of .
The experiment was conducted at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona with undergraduate students enrolled in di¤erent majors, who were recruited by public advertisements posted throughout the campus. The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) .
The experiment consisted of 20 rounds 10 , each of which has 4 stages. In the …rst two stages F has to decide how many tokens to transfer to PO. PO then has to decide whether to accept the transfer or not (stage 3), and choose between two alternatives (stage 4). The subjects are endowed with 40 tokens. 11 The experiment has four treatments: f f , mm, f m, and mf , 8 As explained below, every time the most favorable alternative to F is chosen, both members of all the other pairs in the lab are penalized. 9 See instructions in Appendix 1. throughout the experiment. 12 In the mixed sessions before entering the lab, subjects are told that one gender will sit in one part of the lab and the other gender in the other part. When the instructions are read aloud, they are told that one gender will play one role and the other gender will play the other role. The objective is not only to check whether men and women behave di¤erently or not, but also whether men and women behave di¤erently depending on their partner's gender. 13 Stage 1 F has to decide whether to o¤er a transfer (a bribe) to PO or not. If F decides to o¤er a bribe, the experiment moves to stage 2. If F decides not to o¤er a bribe, s/he is asked the following question: What do you think is the probability that your partner will choose alternative B? 14 , and the experiment moves to stage 4.
Stage 2 F has to decide how many tokens t to o¤er as a bribe. If F o¤ers any positive amount, s/he has to pay a …xed transfer cost of 2 tokens. 15 For the sake of simplicity, t is de…ned in integer numbers. They are small enough to ensure that F does not end up with a negative payo¤. Therefore I take t 2 f1; 2; :::; 10g: After F decides how many tokens to o¤er, s/he is asked: 1) What do you think is the probability that your partner will accept the tokens you have o¤ered?; 2) If your partner accepts the o¤er, What do you think is the probability that s/he will choose alternative B?; and 3) If your partner does not accept the o¤er, What do you think is the probability that s/he will choose alternative C? 1617 Then, the experiment moves to stage 3.
out. See Table 3 . 1 2 A long term relationship between the …rm and the public o¢ cial is represented. 1 3 It would also have been possible to always conduct mixed sessions in which subjects were told the gender of their partner or even their partner's name. Telling them their partner's gender would have placed too much emphasis on gender, while choosing the second option would have placed the anonymity of the subjects at risk. 1 4 Alternative B is the "corrupt" alternative. It is much more favorable to F, but has negative consequences for the members of all the other pairs in the lab. 1 5 The transfer cost represents the cost F has to pay to approach PO. This cost is independent from the fact of whether PO accepts the transfer or not. 1 6 Alternative C implies a costly punishment to F. Stage 3 PO has to decide whether or not to accept the bribe o¤ered by F. If PO accepts the bribe, s/he receives 3t 18 , and an integer (n) between 0 and 999 is randomly chosen. If n < 3, the pair is disquali…ed from the experiment -and are only paid the show-up fee -and if n > 3, the experiment moves to stage 4. 19 If PO decides to reject the bribe, then the experiment moves to stage 4. 20 Stage 4 PO has to decide between di¤erent alternatives.
i) If PO has accepted the bribe, s/he has to decide between alternative A and B. Alternative
A is the "non-corrupt" alternative, which is slightly better for PO and has no consequences for the other participants. Alternative B is the "corrupt" alternative, which is much more favorable to F but has negative externalities. When alternative B is chosen, 3 tokens are discounted from the earnings of all the other subjects in the lab. This represents the negative externality that corruption has over the public. 21 The minimum possible deduction is 0 if no pair (apart from his own) chooses alternative B, and 3 (g 1) if all other pairs choose alternative B, where g is the number of pairs in the lab. 22 The payo¤s are de…ned in Table 1 . 23 Table 1 : Payo¤s if the public o¢ cial accepts the bribe PO's payo¤s are higher if s/he chooses alternative A rather than B. This is so to re ‡ect the 1 8 The number of tokens is tripled to show the di¤erence in marginal utility between the …rm (the briber) and the public o¢ cial. It is assumed that the income of a public o¢ cial is lower than the income obtained in a private business such as a …rm. 1 9 In the real world, the probability of being discovered is small but the punishment is generally severe. The design tries to captures this fact. 2 0 Abbink et al. (2002) also choose a random number to determine whether or not to disqualify the pair.
Amount transferred Alternative chosen A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B
They …nd that the inclusion of a small probability of being disquali…ed (0.3%) signi…cantly decreases the level of corruption in comparison to the case with no probability of being disquali…ed. Therefore, although using a random number generator is a concern since subjects may not believe that this is a possible outcome, their result shows that subjects really perceive the disquali…cation as a possible result. 2 1 As reported in many papers, corruption is positively related to crime and negatively related to economic development, among other negative consequences. 2 2 There were 13 pairs in the room for 3 sessions , while there were 12 pairs in the remaining session. This di¤erence is due to technical problems in the laboratory. 2 3 The deductions are not included in the following tables.
fact that when choosing a corrupt alternative, PO will have to pay some costs, for example, hiding some information from his/her superiors.
ii) If PO rejects the bribe, s/he has to decide between alternative A and C. Alternative C implies a costly punishment to F. When PO rejects the bribe, the probability of being disquali…ed is zero. For this reason, I introduced the possibility that PO may punish F to induce F to evaluate the corruptibility of PO before o¤ering a bribe. In this situation, even if PO rejects the bribe and thus the probability of being disquali…ed and penalized is zero, F can be punished by PO.
The payo¤s are shown in Table 2 . When they are caught, both subjects are excluded from the experiment and only paid the show-up fee. In this case the subjects are asked to complete a questionnaire. To persuade the subjects to remain in the lab, they are o¤ered an extra payment of 2 euros when they learn that they are disquali…ed.
The game tree is shown in Figure 1 . 24 
Figure 1: Game tree
At the end of each round, subjects are informed only about the payo¤ they obtain as a result of the decisions made by their own group, i.e. they are not informed about the deductions due to other pairs choosing alternative B until the end of the experiment. In this way, independence between pairs is maintained.
The …nal payo¤s are calculated as the sum of all the period payo¤s converted into eurosthe rate of conversion is 1.5 euros for 100 tokens plus the show-up fee (3 euros).
After the 20 rounds are over, the subjects are given a questionnaire to rate the likelihood of their engaging in 16 risky activities on a 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely) scale. 25 The sum of the answers gives the degree of risk loving of the subjects -the higher the sum, the 
Results
The level of corruption is observed in the frequency and amount of bribes o¤ered and the frequency of B (corrupt) choices induced by bribes. Table 4 shows the number of subjects and some preliminary results. No pair was disquali…ed in any session. The average earnings include the show-up fee (3 euros).
The average bribe offered is conditional on being positive. The frequency of B choices is conditional on having accepted the bribe. The …rst preliminary conclusion that can be drawn from Table 4 is that the frequency of bribes and the average bribe o¤ered are higher when F is a man. Bribes are more frequently accepted when they come from a male F, while the lowest rate of acceptance is observed when a female PO is paired with a female F. The highest frequency of B choices is observed when only men are playing, while the lowest frequency is observed when only women are playing.
There are six possible scenarios that could take place in each stage game: a bribe is not o¤ered and alternative A or B is chosen, a bribe is o¤ered and accepted by PO and alternative A or B is chosen, or a bribe is o¤ered and rejected and alternative A or C is chosen. Given that the last case (bribe is rejected and alternative C is chosen) is only observed 7 times, the last two alternatives are considered jointly. Table A5 in Appendix 2 shows how frequently each of these possible scenarios is observed for each group in each of the sessions. 4 groups (17 times in total) in the f m session, 6 groups in the mf (42 times) and in the mm session (46 times), and 2 groups (5 times) in the f f sessions follow the path: F o¤ers a bribe, PO accepts it and chooses alternative B, i.e. the scenario that is de…ned as corrupt.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. In subsection 3.1, the decisions taken by F are analyzed. In subsection 3.2, I present the predictions made by F about PO's behavior, while in the following two subsections I analyze the decisions taken by PO and the subjects'earnings, respectively.
Decisions taken by the …rm
The …rst decision F has to take is whether to o¤er a transfer (bribe) to PO. If F decides to o¤er a transfer, then s/he has to decide how many tokens to o¤er.
The percentage of men that decide to o¤er a bribe at least once is 80%, while the percentage of women is 65% (p-value=0.247). 26 Moreover, the average number of times women o¤er a bribe (3:2) is smaller (p-value=0.000) than the average number of times men o¤er one (6). On average, men o¤er a bribe to a male PO 5:2 times, while the number of times they o¤er a bribe to a female PO is 7 (p-value = 0.025). On the contrary, the number of times women o¤er a bribe does not depend on their partner's gender. It is 3:4 when playing with a male PO and 2:8 when their partner was another woman (p-value = 0.398).
RESULT 1: On average, women o¤ er a bribe less frequently than men.
Analyzing the second decision -the amount o¤ered once the subject has decided to o¤er a bribe -I …nd that the average bribe o¤ered by men is 5:11 tokens, and by women, 3:38 tokens (p-value=0.000). As reported in Table 4 The …gures below show the frequency of bribes o¤ered and the average bribe -conditional on being positive -by period. Figure 3 shows that men o¤er a bribe more frequently than women. Figure 4 shows that -with the exception of periods 2 and 11-the bribe o¤ered by men is higher than the bribe o¤ered by women, as observed with the aggregated values. 29 
Period

Frequency of bribes offered
Male Firm Female Firm Figure 3 : Frequency of bribes o¤ered by period 2 9 The econometric analysis below justi…es the aggregation of the data from sessions f m and f f on the one hand, and mm and mf on the other. In what follows, I econometrically analyze the decisions F has to take, i.e. whether to o¤er a bribe to PO, and if so, how many tokens to o¤er. Regarding the decision to send a transfer,
I estimate a probit model with a clustered standard error, whose results are shown in Table 5 .
The second decision for those who decided to o¤er a bribe is to determine how many tokens to
o¤er. An OLS model is estimated and the results are shown in Table 6 . I review the results by analyzing the e¤ects of the (signi…cant) explanatory variables in both decisions at the same time.
The independent variables are the gender of the players (the dummy variables take a value of 1 if the player is a woman), the actions PO has taken in the two previous periods, the degree of risk loving (only in the …rst decision), and the period. I also include interaction terms between 3 0 The average bribe o¤ered when PO has chosen alternative A in the previous period when no bribe was o¤ered is 3:63, while the average bribe is 3:08 if PO has chosen alternative A in the previous period after accepting a bribe. 3 1 The average bribe o¤ered when PO has chosen alternative B in the previous period when no bribe was o¤ered by F is 5:86, while the average bribe o¤ered is 5:55 if PO has chosen alternative B in the previous period after accepting a bribe.
the gender of F and the following variables: PO´s gender, PO's actions and F's risk loving degree; the last of which is only in the …rst estimation. 32 Degree of risk loving is included as an explanatory variable in the …rst decision because deciding to o¤er a transfer to PO implies a risk, since there is a 0.003 probability that the two subjects will be disquali…ed from the experiment 33 and only earn the show-up fee. 34 As explained above, the degree of risk loving is measured in the post experimental questionnaire using the Datta Gupta el al. Table A5 ). Therefore, there are 5 dummies that re ‡ect PO´s previous actions. The dummy that takes a value of 1 if no bribe is o¤ered and alternative B is chosen is the excluded scenario (in the previous period and two periods ago). 3 2 Although the coe¢ cients of these interacted variables are not reported in Tables 5 and 6 , they are taken into account when calculating the marginal e¤ects shown. 3 3 If PO accepts the bribe. 3 4 It is not included in the second estimation because the amount o¤ered as a bribe does not in ‡uence the probability of being disquali…ed. Nonetheless, I tested a model including this variable and it does not change any of the results reported. 3 5 Including more than 2 lags a¤ects the signi…cance of lag 1 and lag 2 due to high levels of correlation and does not increase the explanatory power of the model. Table 6 : OLS regression of the bribe o¤ered The …rst conclusion that can be derived from Table 5 is that the gender of the players does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the decision to o¤er a bribe. The probability of o¤ering a bribe is not in ‡uenced by either F's gender nor by PO's gender. 36 Although result 1 states that male F o¤ers a transfer more frequently than female F, gender is not a signi…cant explanatory variable when control variables are included. On the other hand, gender has an e¤ect on the bribe o¤ered. In line with result 2, the bribe o¤ered is lower if F is a woman.
These results show that despite the fact that the probability of o¤ering a bribe is not in ‡uenced by F's gender, the amount o¤ered is in ‡uenced: female F o¤ers lower bribes than male F. If it holds that the lower the amount o¤ered as a bribe, the lower the probability that PO will choose alternative B, then we should observe a lower level of corruption when F is a woman.
The actions PO has taken in previous periods a¤ect the probability of o¤ering a bribe and the amount o¤ered, which decrease if PO has chosen alternative A after no bribe was o¤ ered by F in the previous period. A possible interpretation is that choosing alternative A in this situation is seen by F as a sign that no cooperation can be expected from PO. On the other hand, the probability of o¤ering a bribe increases if PO has accepted a bribe and has chosen alternative B one or two periods ago. In this case, a corrupt relationship between F and PO is observed. On the other hand, this dummy variable has a negative sign in the OLS estimation when it refers to an action taken one period ago, but has a positive sign if the action was taken two periods ago. This means that the bribe o¤ered is higher if PO has accepted a bribe and has chosen alternative B two periods ago, but the bribe is lower if this happened one period ago.
A feasible explanation for the negative sign is that F is trying to establish a "cheaper" corrupt relation. F knows that PO is willing to cooperate and so now tries to achieve cooperation with a lower bribe. The positive sign of the variable lagged 2 periods shows a persistence of the corrupt relationship in accordance with the sign observed in Table 4 .
Although they do not a¤ect the amount o¤ered, other variables that positively a¤ect the probability of o¤ering a bribe are those which re ‡ect the following actions taken by PO two periods ago: 1) s/he has rejected the bribe, and 2) s/he has accepted the bribe and has chosen alternative A. In these cases, it could be interpreted that F thinks that PO's action is due to a low bribe and not to the fact that PO is unwilling to engage in a corrupt relation (in case of rejection) or unwilling to choose an alternative that has negative externalities (in case of accepting the bribe but choosing alternative A). S/he therefore o¤ers a bribe again.
The variable period has a signi…cant negative e¤ect on the probability of o¤ering a bribethe probability decreases across periods -but it is not signi…cant in the OLS estimation.
One variable that is signi…cant in the OLS, but not in the probit estimation, is the dummy that shows that PO has accepted a bribe and has chosen alternative A in the previous period.
To some extent, its negative sign contradicts the positive e¤ect the variable has in the OLS estimation when it refers to this action taken two periods ago. If this variable has a positive sign, it would mean that F thought that PO chose alternative A because the bribe was not high enough. However, its negative sign means that F is replying to PO's "nasty" action (he has not chosen the alternative most favorable to F) with another "nasty" action -lowering the bribe o¤ered.
Finally, contrary to what could be expected, the risk loving degree does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the decision to o¤er a bribe.
The main conclusion from the previous econometric analysis is the same as result 2.
Beliefs regarding the public o¢ cial' s actions
After F has made his/her decisions, F is asked about his/her beliefs regarding the actions PO would take. In case F has not o¤ered a bribe to PO, s/he is asked: What do you think is the probability that your partner will choose alternative B? 37 If F has o¤ered a bribe, s/he is asked about the probability of PO accepting the transfer and the probability of PO choosing alternative B if PO accepts the transfer, or alternative C if PO rejects the transfer.
When F does not o¤er a bribe, men assign on average a 0:18 probability of PO choosing alternative B, while women assign on average a probability of 0:10 (p-value=0.000). Women are not in ‡uenced by their partner's gender, while men are. Men assign a higher probability to a male PO (0:23) than to a female PO (0:13) (p-value=0.017).
When F o¤ers a bribe, men assign a higher probability to PO accepting the bribe (0:81) and PO choosing alternative B (0:60) than women (0:68 and 0:36, respectively). 38
RESULT 3: Men assign a higher probability to PO accepting the bribe and choosing the corrupt alternative than women.
The average probability assigned to a male PO accepting the bribe is higher than the prob- The di¤erence in expectations about the behavior of male and female public o¢ cials shows that Fs expect women to be less corrupt than men.
RESULT 4: Male and female …rms expect female public o¢ cials to choose the corrupt alternative less frequently than male o¢ cials.
Figures 5 and 6 show the average di¤erence between the assigned probabilities and the real frequencies. Figure 5 shows that women tend to overestimate the frequency, while men tend to underestimate it. On the other hand, Figure 6 shows no signi…cant di¤erences between women and men in terms of the accuracy of assigning probabilities. 39 Table 7 shows two tobit estimations for the probabilities of accepting the bribe and choosing alternative B when F decides to o¤er a bribe. 40 The estimations show that once control variables are considered, the gender of the players is no longer signi…cant. The amount o¤ ered as a bribe has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on both probabilities. The other variable that a¤ects both probabilities is the dummy that shows that two periods ago PO has accepted the bribe and has chosen alternative B. As expected, it has a positive e¤ect as it does in the models estimating the probability of o¤ering a bribe and the amount o¤ered. The …rst probability also increases if two periods ago PO has chosen alternative A after no bribe or after a bribe was o¤ ered by F.
The last variable also has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect in the model explaining the decision to o¤er a bribe. Nonetheless, one could expect the previous variable to have a negative sign instead of a positive one. The degree of risk loving has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect -the higher the risk loving degree of F, the higher the probability s/he assigns to PO accepting the bribe.
The probability assigned to PO choosing alternative B decreases if PO has accepted the bribe and has chosen alternative A in the previous period. This variable also has a signi…cant and negative e¤ect on the amount o¤ered as a bribe. 
Decisions taken by the public o¢ cial
The decisions PO has to take depend on whether F has decided to o¤er a bribe to PO or not.
As the focus of the paper is on the manipulation of a public o¢ cial's decisions through the use of a bribe, I analyze the decisions PO takes when F has o¤ered the public o¢ cial a bribe. In this situation, PO's …rst decision is whether to accept the bribe or not. Then, as explained in section 2, PO has to decide between two alternatives.
The percentage of male POs that are o¤ered a bribe at least once in the 20 periods is 73%, while the percentage of women is 72%. When receiving an o¤er, the average frequency of acceptance is 85% for men and 79% for women (p-value = 0.292).
RESULT 5: The frequencies with which men and women accept a bribe are not statistically di¤ erent.
As Table 4 shows, the frequency with which women accept the bribe is 93% when playing with a male F and 49% when playing with a female F (p-value = 0.000). The frequency with which men accept the o¤er when they are playing with a male F is 88%. When F is a woman it is 80% (p-value = 0.225). In this case, women behave di¤erently if playing with a man or with another woman, while men do not. Moreover, the di¤erence between men and women's frequency of acceptance when they are playing with a male F is not statistically signi…cant (pvalue=0:314). When a male F o¤ers a bribe, it is accepted in 88% of the cases if he is playing with another man, and in 93% of the cases when the PO is a woman. When F is a woman, the frequency of acceptance of the bribe o¤ered by her di¤ers (p-value=0.004) if PO is a man (80%) or a woman (49%).
The next step is to analyze the alternative PO chooses once s/he has accepted the bribe o¤ered by F. In this situation, men choose alternative B in 67% of the cases, while women do so in 39% of the cases (p-value = 0.000).
RESULT 6: Women choose alternative B less frequently than men. With some exceptions, both …gures show that the frequency is higher for men than for women. Figure 7 also shows that no male PO takes the action that favors F in period 1, but they do so in the following periods. This is probably a form of strategic behavior to push F to increase the bribe o¤ered. In period 2 the bribe o¤ered -and accepted -is not higher (it was 3:67;
while in period 1 it was 4:07), but 80% of male POs choose alternative B. The evolution of the frequency of B choices is rather similar to the evolution of the bribe amount. The frequency of B choices by the male PO when playing with another man is 78%, but when playing with a woman the percentage is 49% (p-value = 0.004). The percentages for the female PO are 41% and 28%, respectively (p-value = 0.300). In this case, it is men and not women who di¤erentiate according to their partner's gender, although the opposite was observed with respect to the frequency of acceptance. These values are shown in Table 4 .
It is interesting to note that the highest frequency of B choices is observed when only men are playing (78%), while the lowest frequency is observed when only women are playing (28%).
Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix 2 show the frequency of B choices for the four di¤erent sessions. Figure A1 shows that the frequency of B choices by male POs di¤er according to their partner's gender. On the other hand, in line with previous results, the frequency of female POs does not di¤er depending on F's gender. Figure A2 shows that the frequency of females' B choices is lower than the frequency of males', independently of F's gender.
As explained above, F is asked to assign a probability to the event that PO will accept the bribe and that PO will choose alternative B. It turns out that the average assigned probability to PO accepting the bribe is very close to the real frequency when only women are playing -the di¤erence is 0:01-but is not so accurate in the other cases. When only men are playing, they underestimate both frequencies by 0:07 points on average in the …rst probability and by 0:08 points in the second one. When a female F is playing with a male PO, they underestimate the frequency of acceptance and B choices by 0:02 and 0:07 points, respectively. The highest di¤erences are observed when a male F is paired with a female PO. They underestimate the probability of acceptance by 0:11 points, and the probability of PO choosing alternative B by 0:12 points.
In the remainder of this subsection I will show the results of the econometric analysis of the two POs' decisions. The results are shown in Tables 8 and 9 . The estimated models are probits with clustered standard errors. In the …rst model, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if PO accepts the bribe and 0 otherwise. In the second model, the dependent variable takes value 1 if PO chooses the alternative that is most favorable to F (alternative B), and takes value 0 if PO chooses alternative A. The independent variables are the gender of both players (the dummy variables take a value of 1 if the player is a woman); the amount of the bribe o¤ered (and accepted by PO) in the current period, one period ago, and two periods ago; the degree of risk loving (only in the …rst decision), and the period. I also include interaction terms between the gender of the two players, between the gender of PO and the amount of the (current and lagged) bribes, and between PO's gender and the risk loving degree. Risk loving degree is included in the decision of whether to accept the bribe or not because the decision implies a risk. That is, if PO accepts the bribe, then a number is randomly chosen to decide if the pair will be disquali…ed or not. If the pair is not disquali…ed, then PO has to choose one alternative. In this decision the risk loving degree plays no role, given that there is no risk of being disquali…ed at this point. The table shows the marginal effects evaluated at the average of the independent variables. A constant and interaction terms between the two genders, between Female player 2 and the amount of the bribe, and between Female player 2 and Risk loving are included in the estimations. The table shows the marginal effects evaluated at the average of the independent variables. A constant and interaction terms between the two genders and between Female player 2 and the amount of the bribe are included in the estimations. Table 9 : Probit regression of the decision to choose alternative B Although PO's gender does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the decision to accept the bribe when we calculate the marginal e¤ect on the average of the variable re ‡ecting F's gender, it is signi…cant when we calculate the e¤ect when F is 1, i.e. F is a woman. In this case, the marginal e¤ect is 0:3563 and its p-value is 0.02. This means that if F is a woman, the probability that a female PO will accept the bribe is 0:3563 points lower than the probability that a male PO will accept the same bribe. The gender of PO has a signi…cant and negative e¤ect on the decision to choose the corrupt alternative. If PO is a woman, the probability of choosing the alternative most favorable to F is 0:3451 points lower -ceteris paribus-than the probability that a male PO will choose this alternative. This result is similar in some ways to the result in Dreber and Johannesson (2008) . They …nd that men are more prone to lie in order to secure a higher payo¤ to the detriment of their partner's payo¤ than women, while I …nd that men are more prone to choose an alternative that negatively a¤ects the other players.
When F is a woman, the probability that PO will accept the bribe decreases by 0:2350 points.
Nonetheless, this variable is not signi…cant in Table 9 . But if we calculate the marginal e¤ect of Female …rm when PO is a man -instead of doing it on the average of the variable -this variable has a signi…cant and negative e¤ect. The marginal e¤ect is 0:2131 and the p-value is 0.03. This result is in line with the previous result that shows that F's gender is important to male POs when deciding whether to choose alternative B or not. The probability that a male PO will choose alternative B is 0:2131 points lower when F is a woman rather than a man.
As expected, the bribe amount o¤ ered in the current period has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect in both decisions. The higher the amount, the higher the probability of accepting the bribe and choosing alternative B. One more token o¤ered as a bribe increases the probability of acceptance by 0:0489 points and the probability of choosing alternative B by 0:1141 points. RESULT 7: If the public o¢ cial is a woman, the probability of accepting the bribe is lower when the …rm is also a woman.
Contrary to Eckel and
RESULT 8: If the public o¢ cial is a woman, the probability of choosing the corrupt alternative is lower.
Earnings
The Given the di¤erent number of POs that choose alternative B, we have di¤erent deductions in each session. The average deduction in the mm session is 2:78 euros, in the mf session it is 2:02 euros and in the f m and f f sessions they are 1:33 and 0:37 euros, respectively. 42
Therefore, the …nal earnings after subtracting the above deductions are 13:34 euros for male F and 14:39 euros for female F (p-values=0,000). Note that the di¤erence in the …nal earnings has the opposite sign as does the di¤erence in the initial earnings. RESULT 9: Before deductions, male …rms earn on average more than female …rms. Considering the deductions, female …rms earn more than male …rms. Also, female public o¢ cials earn more than male public o¢ cials. The di¤ erence is due to higher deductions when men are playing.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to study in a controlled environment whether women and men behave in di¤erent ways with respect to corruption -as suggested in the papers using …eld data-or, on the contrary, they behave in a similar way. In the experiment, participants took one of two roles, that of a …rm or that of a public o¢ cial. The possibility of corruption was introduced by allowing the …rst player (the …rm) to send some amount of money as a bribe to the second player (the public o¢ cial) in the hope of persuading the o¢ cial to take a decision favorable to the …rm, although this decision had negative externalities over all the other participants in the experiment.
The percentage of male …rms that decided to o¤er a bribe to the public o¢ cer at least once was 80%, while the percentage of female …rms that did so was 65%. Moreover, the average number of transfers was 6 for men and 3:1 for women; statistically di¤erent quantities. The average amounts o¤ered -conditional on being positive -were also statistically di¤erent.
They were 5:11 and 3:38 for male and female …rms, respectively.
The estimations show that even when controlling for the previous actions of the public o¢ cer, the public o¢ cer's gender and the …rm's risk aversion, a lower amount was transferred if the …rm is a woman. This result implies that if the manipulation of the public o¢ cer's decisions positively depends on the amount o¤ered as a bribe -as I found-then the probability of observing a corrupt relationship will be lower if the …rm is a woman. When estimating the probabilities of the public o¢ cer's actions, men assigned a higher probability than women to the public o¢ cer accepting the bribe and choosing the corrupt alternative. Moreover, both male and female …rms expected female public o¢ cials to choose the corrupt alternative less frequently than male o¢ cials.
The average frequencies of bribe acceptance were not statistically di¤erent for male and female public o¢ cials. When the bribe was accepted, men chose alternative B in 67% of the cases, while women did so in 39% of the cases; statistically di¤erent percentages. The highest average percentage of B choices was observed when only men were playing (78%), while the lowest was observed when only women were playing (28%). The probit models estimated show that if the public o¢ cial is a woman, the probability of accepting the bribe is lower (if the …rm is also a woman), as well as the probability of choosing the corrupt alternative.
Given the results mentioned above, the conclusion is in line with the …eld data papers. That is, women are less corrupt than men. Thus, increasing participation by women in the labor force and politics would be expected to help in …ghting corruption.
One question that arises at this point is whether the observed di¤erences are due to stereotyping behavior or are simply inherent di¤erences between males and females. If women are stereotyped as being less corrupt, they would receive less bribe o¤ers and would therefore be less frequently involved in corrupt activities. This would not necessarily be due to inherent gender di¤erences, but to the stereotyped behavior of the bribers.
With the raw numbers, I found that men o¤ered bribes more frequently to females than to male public o¢ cials, although they o¤ered them lower bribes. With respect to the assigned probabilities, I found that both genders assigned a lower probability to their partner choosing alternative B when playing with a female public o¢ cer instead of a male public o¢ cer. This result might show some stereotyping behavior or a learning process by the …rms, given that female o¢ cers indeed chose alternative B less frequently than males. Despite these results, the partner's gender is generally not signi…cant in the econometric analysis of the decisions and assigned probabilities. Partner's gender is only signi…cant in the estimation of the probability of accepting the bribe, and when the public o¢ cial is a man in the estimation of the probability of choosing the corrupt alternative. Both probabilities are lower if the …rm is a woman. Therefore, I observe only weak evidence of stereotyping behavior.
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) , one explanation of gender di¤erence in crime is a di¤erence in self-control. Self-control is "the extent to which they are vulnerable to the temptations of the moment" or "the extent to which they are restrained from criminal acts".
This behavior can also be extended to di¤erences in corruption. This would mean that women exercise greater self-control and therefore refrain from engaging in corrupt behavior. Moreover, as Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) point out, people with low self-control tend to be more egocentric and disinterested in others'needs. In relation with corruption, one possible explanation for the di¤erence observed in the experiment is that women are more sensitive to others'losses and that is why they choose the corrupt alternative with negative externalities over all the other participants less frequently.
To reach a de…nitive conclusion as to why gender di¤erence is observed, more studies need to be conducted on this subject. This paper is an attempt to study gender di¤erences in corruption through a lab experiment, albeit further research should shed more light on this topic.
Appendix 1: Instructions
(Original text in Spanish)
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision making. You will be paid 3 euros
for showing up plus the money you earn during the experiment, which will depend on your and other participants'decisions. At the end of the session you will be paid in private.
From now on, you will not be allowed to speak with the other participants. If you have any questions or doubts at any time during the experiment, please raise your hand and we will attend to you personally.
There are two types of participants in the experiment: player type 1 (hereafter Player 1) and player type 2 (hereafter Player 2). Players 1 are those that have an odd number and Players 2 those that have an even number. At the beginning of the experiment, each Player 1 will be matched with one Player 2 in an anonymous way. This match will be maintained throughout experiment.
The experiment consists of 20 identical and independent rounds. Each round consists of 4 stages which will be explained in short. At the beginning of each round, each participant will be assigned 40 tokens, meaning that each participant will have 40 tokens to be used in this round.
Stage 1
Player 1 has to decide whether to send a transfer to Player 2 or not.
If he does, his credit is reduced by 2 tokens (which is a …xed cost for transferring tokens) and the experiment moves to stage 2.
If Player 1 decides not to send a transfer to Player 2, his credit remains unchanged and the experiment moves to stage 4. an integer ranging from 0 to 999 is randomly drawn by the computer (every number has the same probability of being chosen).
-If the randomly drawn number is 0, 1, or 2, then the pair is disquali…ed. This means that the experiment ends for these two players and their earnings in the experiment are 0. They will only receive 3 euros for showing up. These players have to remain in their seats in silence and …ll in a questionnaire that will be distributed to them.
For the other participants, the experiment will continue normally.
- Table A1 Apart from the corresponding payo¤s in each situation (see tables), for every pair that chooses Alternative B (i.e. for each Player 2 that does so) the payo¤ of all the other participants will be decreased by 3 tokens. These 3 tokens are not included in the tables.
CASE 1: Player 1 decided not to o¤er a transfer to Player 2.
The payo¤s are as follows. This means that if Player 2 chooses Alternative A, the payo¤s are 50 tokens for both players.
If, on the contrary, Alternative B is chosen, the payo¤s are 70 tokens for Player 1 and 45 for Player 2. If Alternative B is chosen, 3 tokens will be deducted from the payo¤s of both members of all the other pairs in the room. The amounts in the table are the total payo¤s corresponding to this round, including the initial tokens (40 and the added tokens for each alternative chosen.
CASE 2 : Player 1 decided to o¤er a transfer of tokens, which was accepted by Player 2.
In this case the payo¤s depend on the amount transferred. The amounts in the following table are the total payo¤s corresponding to this round of the experiment, including the initial tokens (40), the added tokens for each alternative chosen, the transfer made, and the cost of making the transfer. Table A3 For example, In this case the payo¤s are as follows. 
